

Online Appendix

The online appendix is organized as follows. Appendix A presents a list of parties classified by whether they are mainstream or niche, as well as by major and minor party status. Appendix B provides more information on the coding and characteristics of variables from the main analyses. Appendix C discusses the BUC estimator and preferred empirical specification at greater length. Appendix D elaborates on additional analyses that address and refute a series of alternative hypotheses that could potentially explain my results. Finally, Appendix E demonstrates that the results in the paper are robust to other measures of party emphasis and core supporters, alternative estimators and measures of key variables, and the exclusion of any particular country or issue. Appendix E also includes evidence that the chosen seat share threshold and time frame used to calculate historical electoral performance, 2000–2014, provide the best model fit.

Appendix A List of Parties

Table A.1: Classification of Parties by Party Family and Size

Country	Large Mst. ¹	Large Niche	Small Mst.	Small Niche
Austria	ÖVP, SPÖ	FPÖ	NEOS	BZÖ, GRUNE
Bulgaria	GERB, SDS		ABV	DPS, ATAKA
Croatia		HDZ, SDP	HSLs, HSS	IDS, ORaH, HSP, HL-SR, HDSSB
Czech Republic	ODS, ČSSD	KSČM	ANO 2011, KDU-CSL, TOP 09, SVO- BODNI	SZ
Denmark	V, SD		KF, LA, RV	DF, SF
Estonia	EK, ER		IRL, SDE	EER
Finland	KESK, SDP, KOK		KD, PS	VAS, VIHR, RKP/SFP
Flanders	CD&V, VLD, SPA	VB, N-VA		Groen
France	PS, UMP			EELV, FN, PG
Germany	CDU, SPD		FDP	Linke, Grunen, AfD, Piraten

Table A.1: **Classification of Parties by Party Family and Size**

Country	Large Mst. ¹	Large Niche	Small Mst.	Small Niche
Greece	ND, PASOK		Potami	ANEL, DI-MAR, KKE, LAOS, SYRIZA, XA
Hungary	Fidesz, MSZP			DK, JOBBIK, LMP, E14
Ireland	FF, FG			GP, SP, Sinn Fein
Italy	PD, FI		Fdl, NCD, UDC	SEL, M5S, LN
Latvia	SDPS, ZZS		V	LKS
Lithuania	DP, LSDP, TS-LKD		LRLS, LVZS, TT	LLRA
Poland	PO, PiS, SLD		KNP, PSL, SP, RP	
Portugal	PSD, PS		PP	MPT, BE
Romania	PNL, PSD		PC, PDL, PMP	UDMR, PP-DD
Slovakia	SDKU-DS, Smer-SD		KDH, SaS, NOVA, OLaNO	MH, SMK-MKP, SNS
Slovenia	SDS, SD		PS, SLS	DeSUS
Spain	PP, PSOE		UpyD	EAJ/PNV, CC, ERC, C's, BNG, Podemos
Sweden	M, SAP		C, KD, FP	SD, PIRAT, FI, MP, V
The Netherlands	CDA, PvdA, VVD		D66	GL, PvdD, PVV, SP
United Kingdom	CONS, LAB		LIBDEM	Plaid, SNP, Green, UKIP
Wallonia	PS, MR		cdH, PP	ECOLO

Appendix B Data

B.1 Data Description

In the analyses included in the body of the paper, the main variables of interest are the policy extremism of core party supporters, the ideological distinctiveness of core party supporters, and the level of emphasis parties place on different issues. For these analyses, I use data from the 2014 European Election Study and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey to construct measures of supporter extremism, supporter distinctiveness and party emphasis for eight issues. These sources allow for a better measure of both these variables than earlier versions of the same surveys, as well as other cross-national surveys of a similar nature.

First, for what seems the first time, experts were asked to classify the importance of issues for parties with reference to virtually the same issues as appeared in the European Election Study in the same year. Second, the 2014 European Election Study asks respondents to place themselves on an eleven-point scale on each issue, rather than simply asking whether, and how much, they agreed or disagreed with an issue position. The former generates a better measure of respondents' policy preferences as conceptualized here; the latter seems better suited to measuring respondents' preferences as conceptualized within a 'directional' framework (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989). This is because, by the second measure, stronger disagreement may not necessarily indicate that a respondent has more extreme preferences, only more intensely held preferences.

Third, the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey improves on earlier expert measures of party emphasis by asking experts to identify, and rank, the three most important issues for each party. By contrast, earlier surveys asked experts to identify the salience of an issue for each party on an eleven-point scale. This provides greater room for measurement error due to contamination, as experts, like voters, may misconstrue a party with a more extreme position as also placing more emphasis on that position. In my case, this kind of measurement error would be particularly problematic, as such contamination might spuriously imply that parties emphasize issues on which they are more extreme. Further, the new measure is more clearly zero-sum: an increase in emphasis on one issue by a party implies a decrease in emphasis on some other issue.


¹Here, parties are classified as mainstream or niche based on party family, with ethnic, nationalist, green, communist and protest parties classified as niche, and liberal, socialist, social democratic, agrarian, conservative, and Christian democratic parties as mainstream. I consider alternative approaches to classifying mainstream and niche parties in Appendix D. Party family designations are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project.

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Median	Min.	Max.
Full Sample				
Party Emphasis	0.48	0.00	0.00	3.00
Supporter Extremism	1.44	1.10	0.00	8.86
Supporter Distinctiveness	1.91	1.58	0.00	8.19
Major Parties				
Party Emphasis	0.56	0.00	0.00	3.00
Supporter Extremism	0.99	0.78	0.00	6.70
Supporter Distinctiveness	1.85	1.54	0.00	8.19
Minor Parties				
Party Emphasis	0.44	0.00	0.00	3.00
Supporter Extremism	1.72	1.39	0.00	8.86
Supporter Distinctiveness	1.95	1.61	0.01	7.85

Table B.1 reports descriptive statistics for party emphasis, core supporter extremism and core supporter distinctiveness for each issue. As might be expected, major party supporters are, on average, less extreme relative to the mean voter than minor party supporters. Figure B.1 presents kernel density plots of average European voter preferences on each issue. Recall that the argument laid out in Section 2 assumes that voter preferences on any given issue are approximately single-peaked and symmetric – implying that there are more voters with moderate rather than extreme policy preferences on each issue. Figure B.1 makes evident that this assumption is satisfied except in two cases: EU integration, where voter preferences are, on average, highly right-skewed, and same sex marriage, where voter preferences are, on average, trimodal. Nevertheless, my results are robust to excluding these two issues from the analyses.

Figure B.1: Density Plots of Average European Voter Preferences by Issue



B.2 Coding Decisions

Table B.2: Coding Issue Emphasis by Parties

EES 2014 Voter Survey ²	CHES 2014 MIP Issue Category
Q17.1 You are fully in favour of state intervention in the economy.	1. State Intervention
Q17.2 You are fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in (<i>country</i>).	2. Redistribution
Q17.3 You are fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services.	3. Public Services vs. Taxes
Q17.4 You are fully in favour of same-sex marriage.	4. Social Lifestyle
Q17.5 You fully support privacy rights even if they hinder efforts to combat crime.	5. Civil Liberties
Q17.6 You are fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration. ³	6. Immigration; Multiculturalism
Q17.7 The EU should have more authority over the EU Member States' economic and budgetary policies.	7. EU Integration
Q17.8 Environmental protection should always take priority even at the cost of economic growth.	8. Environment

²For each issue, respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 0 to 10. The '0' end of the scale for each issue is given below.

³Observations for this issue were recoded so that '10' measures the most right-wing position possible on this issue.

Table B.3: **Coding Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis**

Country	Parties in Coalition c. 1 Jan 2014 ⁴
Belgium	CD&V, Open VLD, MR, Sp.A, CdH
Bulgaria	BSP, DPS
Croatia	Kukuriku coalition: IDS, HNS-LD, HSU, SDP
Czech Republic	ČSSD, ANO 2011, KDU-CSL
Denmark	SD, RV, SF
Estonia	ER, IRL
Finland	KOK, SDP, VAS, VIHR, RKP, KD
France	(A) PS, PG, EELV (B) UMP, NC, PRV, AC
Greece	PASOK, ND, DIMAR
Hungary	(A) Fidesz, KDNP (B) MSZP, E14, DK
Ireland	FG, Labour
Italy	(A) PD, SEL, CD (B) FI, LN, FdI
Lithuania	LSDP, DP, TT, LLRA
Poland	PO, PSL
Romania	(A) Social Liberal Union: PSD, PNL, PC (B) Right Romania Alliance: PDL, other small parties
Slovenia	SDS, SLS, DeSUS
Sweden	Alliance: M, C, FP, KD
Netherlands	VVD, PvdA
United Kingdom	CONS, LIBDEM

⁴For each party j , this variable is coded as the average emphasis placed on the issue by all coalition partners except party j . If a party has no coalition partners in the dataset, the variable takes the value 0.

Appendix C Empirical Strategy

I estimate the effect of, variously, supporter extremism, supporter distinctiveness or party positional extremism on parties' emphasis decisions using the BUC fixed effects ordered logit estimator proposed by Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann (2015). The latent model that I estimate is the following:

$$Y_{ijk}^* = X_{ijk}\beta_1 + X_{ijk}M_j\beta_2 + \mathbf{Z}_{ijk}\boldsymbol{\beta} + M_j\gamma_k + \alpha_{ik} + \epsilon_{ijk}$$

$$Y_{ijk} = n \iff \lambda_{ik}^n \leq Y_{ijk}^* < \lambda_{ik}^{n+1}$$

Here, for each country i , Y_{ijk}^* measures each party j 's (unobserved) level of emphasis on issue k , X_{ijk} measures the extremism, or distinctiveness, of party j 's core supporters on issue k (or the extremism of the party's own position), and \mathbf{Z}_{ijk} is a vector of control variables. M_j is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if party j is a major party, and 0 otherwise. Parties' observed level of emphasis on each issue k is measured by an ordered categorical response variable Y_{ijk} , which takes the value n when the unobserved value of Y_{ijk}^* is between λ_{ik}^n and λ_{ik}^{n+1} .

The theory developed in Section 2 suggests that a party's emphasis on an issue *relative to its opponents* will depend on the extremism of its core supporters *relative to its opponents' supporters*, with a party's optimal emphasis strategy depending on whether it is a minor or a major party. In particular, all parties face an incentive to disproportionately emphasize the issue which, if it were the only issue important to voters, would mean the party would be preferred to all its opponents by the voters it is targeting. The implications of this incentive for parties' salience strategies are the following. On a particular issue, the major party that is most centrist on the issue *relative to its opponents* will prefer to place more emphasis on that issue *than its opponents*. This may lead such a party to disproportionately emphasize an issue on which its position is more extreme than on other issues, but more centrist than its opponents on that issue. Analogously, among minor parties, the party with the most extreme position on the issue *relative to its opponents* will prefer to place more emphasis on that issue *than its opponents* – which may lead such a party to place less emphasis on an issue on which its position is, in absolute terms, more extreme. While some parties will be more centrist than others on average, across all issues, each party will have some issue positions which are more centrist relative to its opponents' positions on those issues, and some positions which are more extreme relative to those of its opponents.

To assess the empirical evidence for this precise relationship, I include an interaction

term between X_{ijk} and the indicator variable M_j , and also include country-issue fixed effects, denoted α_{ik} in the regression equation above. Country-issue fixed effects ensure that only variation in emphasis and supporter extremism *between* parties on an issue in a given country is used to identify the desired effect. Without these fixed effects, we might, for instance, spuriously identify a positive association between supporter extremism and party emphasis if it is the case that all parties place more emphasis on issues on which parties' core supporters are, on average, more polarized in a country – even if it is the case that, in a given country and for a particular issue, the party with more extreme supporters places less emphasis on the issue than its opponents. The inclusion of country-issue fixed effects also controls for country, issue, and country-issue specific factors that may lead parties to emphasize some issues more than others. For instance, in a particular country the issue of immigration might be especially salient, leading all parties to place relatively more emphasis on this issue, regardless of their core supporters' preferences. I also estimate issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties, denoted $M_j\gamma_k$ in the regression equation above, to account for the differences in the issues favored by each type of party.

In performing this analysis, the BUC fixed effects ordered logit estimator (hereafter BUC estimator) proposed by Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann (2015) is preferred to an unconditional fixed effects ordered logit estimator and to a linear fixed effects model estimated by OLS. The BUC estimator generalizes the conditional logit estimator to accommodate ordered dependent variables. The conditional logit estimator (Chamberlain 1980) allows us to consistently estimate coefficients in a model with both a binary dependent variable and fixed effects, when using an unconditional fixed effects logit estimator would produce coefficient estimates that are inconsistent as well as severely biased. When dealing with an ordered dependent variable in a model with fixed effects, researchers have frequently recoded the dependent variable as a binary variable and used a conditional logit estimator to obtain consistent parameter estimates (Kassenböhmer and Haisken-DeNew 2009; Senik 2004). However, this requires the researcher to arbitrarily choose a threshold above which the dependent variable takes the value one, and discards potentially important variation. A variety of approaches have been suggested for estimating an ordered logit model with fixed effects; in their survey of available estimators, Riedl and Geishecker (2014) show that the BUC estimator consistently delivers the most efficient, consistent and least biased parameter estimates.

The BUC estimator is a binary recoded conditional logit estimator, where the original dependent variable with N categories is recoded into $N - 1$ different dichotomizations

using $N - 1$ thresholds. Each observation in the original dataset is then duplicated $N - 1$ times. In this analysis, this entails recoding the original dependent variable using three different dichotomizations, and duplicating each country-party-issue observation three times. Parameter estimates are obtained by applying a standard conditional logit estimator to the new dataset, with standard errors clustered by country-party-issue, as the new observations are dependent by construction. In all specifications, I report standard errors clustered by country-issue, which allows for dependence between observations within country-issue clusters and so within country-party-issue clusters as well.

Beck (2015) observes that an unconditional fixed effects logit estimator is consistent when the number of observations per group is large, as there is no incidental parameters problem. However, when group sizes are small, the unconditional fixed effects logit estimator is inconsistent. Further, although Katz (2001) and Coupé (2005) show that the bias in unconditional fixed effects logit estimates is small when the average group size is greater than sixteen, in my analysis, the average number of observations within each country-issue group is 6.81. Consequently, an unconditional fixed effects logit estimator is inappropriate in my case.

As with conditional logit estimates, it is not possible to recover marginal effects when using the BUC estimator. For this reason, Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest that practitioners use a linear probability model with a binary dependent variable in contexts where the incidental parameters problem may be a concern.⁵ However, in my case, a linear fixed effects estimator assumes cardinality of the dependent variable, which seems a heroic assumption. Cardinality would require, for instance, that the gap in emphasis between a party's third most important issue and its second most important issue is the same as that between its third most important issue and any issue outside the top three. By comparison, the BUC estimator, like any ordered logit estimator, estimates values for the cutpoints dividing the latent issue emphasis scale into the emphasis categories we observe. This allows, for instance, the gap in emphasis between a party's third most important issue and its second most important issue to be smaller than that between its third most important issue and any issue outside the top three. By doing so, we address yet another potential concern: measurement error in the dependent variable, as we cannot distinguish between, for example, the fourth and fifth most important issue for a party using the available data. Although the loss of information from using a four point rather than an eight point scale means that our estimates are still inaccurate, the

⁵See Beck (2015) for a discussion of the incidental parameters problem as it is encountered in political science research.

loss of efficiency is diminished when using an ordered logit estimator instead of OLS. Further, Beck (2015, 11-17) notes that when there are very few observations within a group fixed effect, an OLS estimator produces less accurate estimates than a conditional logit estimator.

Regardless, using either an unconditional fixed effects ordered logit estimator or a linear fixed effects model produces substantively similar results to those I report in the paper, as demonstrated in Section E of this document.

Appendix D Alternative Hypotheses

D.1 Do Emphasis Decisions Determine Major Party Status?

It is possible that the parties that emphasize their more moderate positions are more likely to become major parties, and parties that emphasize their more extreme positions are more likely to remain minor parties. However, the following analyses suggest that this cannot credibly account for the findings in Section 4. Rather, it is more plausible that traditionally large parties prefer to emphasize their more moderate positions, and traditionally small parties prefer to emphasize their more distinctive and typically extreme positions.

First, consider Table D.1, which suggests that changes in party seat share pre-date rather than post-date the issue emphasis decisions I have highlighted. For convenience, Models 1 and 3 repeat the analyses from Table 2, which find the expected relationships between party size, supporter extremism, supporter distinctiveness and issue emphasis when using average historical electoral performance to classify major and minor parties. However, when these analyses are replicated using parties' current seat share⁶ to classify parties, we find no statistically significant difference between the emphasis strategies of major and minor parties in response to supporter extremism (Model 2), and estimate a smaller z-statistic for the interaction term between major party status and supporter distinctiveness than before (Model 4).

That the difference between major and minor parties we observe is better predicted by their average historical electoral performance than their current electoral performance

⁶When measuring a party's 'current' seat share, I use the seat share received by each party in the national legislature following the election most proximate to 1 January 2014. This includes elections that were held after the completion of fieldwork for the 2014 European Election Study and the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. However, I contend that these figures better reflect the party's electoral position at the time of fieldwork than its vote share in an election held more than four years prior.

Table D.1: Classifying Parties Using Current vs. Past Seat Share

	(1) Model 2 (Past)	(2) Model 2 (Current)	(3) Model 4 (Past)	(4) Model 4 (Current)
Supporter Extremism	0.346*** (0.099)	0.276** (0.100)		
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.607*** (0.155)	-0.157 (0.184)		
Supporter Distinctiveness			0.272*** (0.081)	0.273*** (0.077)
Supporter Distinctiveness \times Major			-0.436*** (0.105)	-0.360*** (0.107)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.195** (0.075)	-0.148* (0.072)	-0.228** (0.077)	-0.165* (0.077)
Prior Office Experience	0.158 (0.204)	0.269 (0.193)	0.154 (0.196)	0.329 (0.197)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	0.075 (0.085)	0.119 (0.089)	0.087 (0.084)	0.134 (0.087)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154
Log Likelihood	-1,477.450	-1,519.998	-1,478.329	-1,514.838

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties and country-issue fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

is corroborated by analyses which use party seat share from 1995, first, as a proxy, and second, as an instrument for current electoral performance.⁷ These results are reported in Table D.2. Again, for convenience, Table D.2 reproduces Model 2 from Table 2 in Section 4 (now Model 1). Model 2 in Table D.2 repeats the same analysis using party seat share from 1995 as a proxy for current seat share when coding major party status.⁸ This coding decision means parties which have only recently achieved substantial electoral success are classed as ‘minor’ rather than ‘major’. We continue to find the expected statistically significant relationship between party size, supporter extremism and issue emphasis, and also a statistically and substantively significant difference between how major and minor parties, thus coded, respond to changes in supporter extremism ($p < 0.001$).

Models 3 and 4 use party seat share from 1995 as an instrument for current seat share when coding major party status. There are two prevailing approaches that have been used to extend the linear two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to non-linear models: two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) and two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) (Blundell and Smith 1989; Terza, Basu and Rathouz 2008).⁹ While 2SPS is more frequently used in a non-linear context, only 2SRI delivers consistent estimates in general. Model 3 presents estimates using the 2SPS approach to instrument for current major party status, and Model 4 presents estimates using the 2SRI approach.¹⁰ Both approaches produce statistically and substantively similar results, and also similar results to the original analyses.

The evidence presented in this section strongly counters the suggestion that party emphasis strategies are driving their electoral performance, rather than the other way around. Suppose otherwise. Then, we would expect parties’ current seat share (and major party status) to be very well correlated with their emphasis strategies, but historical seat share to be less so – since parties’ current emphasis decisions are likely imperfectly correlated with their past emphasis decisions. The results presented in Tables D.1 and D.2 show the reverse to be the case: the difference between major and minor party

⁷This variable is coded using the seat share received by each party following the election most proximate to 1 January 1995, and includes information from elections ranging between 1993 and 1997.

⁸In cases where a party did not contest the most proximate election to 1 January 1995 – like, for example, the Five Star Movement in Italy – its 1995 seat share was coded as zero.

⁹Like the 2SLS approach, the 2SPS approach requires that we substitute fitted values from the first-stage regression for the endogenous regressor in the second-stage equation. However, unlike 2SLS, this does not necessarily produce consistent estimates in the non-linear case. In the 2SRI approach, we instead include the first-stage residuals as additional regressors in the second-stage equation, while retaining the endogenous regressors. To adjust for the additional uncertainty our estimates as a result of these procedures, I present bootstrapped standard errors, accounting for the dependence of observations within each country-issue cluster by randomly drawing country-issue clusters.

¹⁰The first-stage F-statistic is 363.64.

Table D.2: Using Past Seat Share to Instrument for Current Major Party Status

	(1) Original	(2) Proxy	(3) 2SPS	(4) 2SRI
Supporter Extremism	0.346*** (0.099)	0.362*** (0.949)	0.482*** (0.130)	0.463*** (0.149)
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.607*** (0.155)	-0.589*** (0.145)	-0.849*** (0.238)	-0.896*** (0.250)
Supporter Extremism \times First Stage Residual				0.708 (0.379)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.195** (0.075)	-0.118 (0.076)	-0.090 (0.099)	-0.140 (0.100)
Prior Office Experience	0.158 (0.204)	0.252 (0.198)	0.301 (0.295)	0.211 (0.299)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	0.075 (0.085)	0.088 (0.085)	0.050 (0.092)	0.047 (0.091)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154
Log Likelihood	-1,477.450	-1,441.729	-1,433.095	-1,410.601

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of party issue emphases. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties and country-issue fixed effects. For Models 1 and 2, standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue; for Models 3 and 4, bootstrapped standard errors are reported.

emphasis strategy we observe is well predicted by their past electoral performance (or that component of current electoral performance that is predicted by their past performance), but not by parties' current electoral performance. The only remaining possibility is that there exists some other extremely persistent factor that is highly correlated with whether a party is major or minor, or which determines a party's historical electoral performance and also its current emphasis strategy. In Table 3 from the paper, I show that none of the following long-standing characteristics of parties fulfill this role: (1) a party's left-right ideology, (2) party family, (3) whether a party is mainstream or niche, (4) whether a party has previously held ministerial office and (5) whether a party is leadership or activist-dominated. In the next section, I elaborate further on the analyses included in Table 3 and report some additional robustness checks.

D.2 Other Alternative Hypotheses

For convenience, I replicate Table 3 here, now labeled Table D.3.

Models 1 and 2 in Table D.3 consider the possibility that the observed distinction in emphasis strategy between major and minor parties is driven by selection by party ideology or party family into these categories (Williams, Seki and Whitten 2016). For instance, we might worry that these results are an artefact of social democratic parties in Europe being overwhelmingly 'major parties', emphasizing redistribution, and locating close to the median voter on this issue. To assuage these concerns, I allow for an issue-specific effect of parties' overall left-right position on their issue emphasis in Model 1¹¹, and control for the average emphasis placed on each issue by parties in the same family in Model 2.¹² We continue to find a statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy in response to changes in core supporter preferences, suggesting that selection by ideology or party family cannot explain the differences we observe.

Model 3 considers the possibility that the difference in behavior between major and minor parties that I find may just reflect the different strategies preferred by 'mainstream' and 'niche' parties (Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012*b*; Meyer and Wagner 2015; Bischof 2017) – since mainstream parties are often 'major' and niche parties usually 'minor'. However, the results in Table D.3 suggest that the distinction between major and minor parties still has considerable explanatory power with respect to this aspect of party emphasis

¹¹Measures of each party's overall left-right placement are taken from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey

¹²Party family designations are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project.

Table D.3: Alternative Explanations for Major vs. Minor Party Emphasis Strategy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Supporter Extremism	0.344*** (0.098)	0.379*** (0.091)	0.223* (0.108)	0.308 (0.260)	0.393** (0.123)	0.464* (0.204)
Supporter Extremism × Major	-0.299* (0.146)	-0.359* (0.163)		-1.063*** (0.263)	-0.498** (0.166)	-0.976** (0.353)
Mean Party Family Emphasis		1.644*** (0.124)				
Supporter Extremism × Major Mainstream			-0.522*** (0.157)			
Supporter Extremism × Minor Niche			0.203 (0.153)			
Supporter Extremism × Major Niche			0.280 (0.663)			
Supporter Extremism × Leadership Domination Index				0.578 (0.483)		
Supporter Extremism × Prior Office Experience					-0.224 (0.177)	
Supporter Extremism × Proportion of Years in Office						0.278 (0.535)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.127 (0.079)	-0.148* (0.074)	-0.162* (0.077)	-0.005 (0.128)	-0.206** (0.075)	-0.128 (0.166)
Prior Office Experience	0.439* (0.186)	0.194 (0.197)	0.062 (0.198)	0.562* (0.228)		0.421 (0.262)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	0.095 (0.088)	-0.053 (0.075)	-0.004 (0.078)	0.062 (0.087)	0.044 (0.080)	0.039 (0.091)
Observations	1,154	1,154	1,154	615	1,154	615
Log Likelihood	-1,326.411	-1,271.749	-1,406.627	-783.804	-1,448.461	-809.004

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of party issue emphases. All models include country-issue fixed effects, and all except Model 3 include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Model 3 includes issue-specific intercepts for major mainstream, major niche, minor mainstream and minor niche parties, while Models 4, 5 and 6 also allow for leadership domination, prior office experience and a party's governing history, respectively, to have an issue-specific influence on party emphasis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

strategies, even after accounting for whether a party is mainstream or niche. In fact, I will go on to show that major and minor parties exhibit considerable variation in their ‘niceness’, regardless of the measure used.


There is considerable debate as to how best to classify parties as mainstream or niche. Early research on this topic distinguished mainstream and niche parties on the basis of party family (Meguid 2005; Adams et al. 2006); more recently, researchers have argued that party ‘niceness’ is a continuous variable, relating to the number or nature of issues parties emphasize (Wagner 2012*a*; Meyer and Miller 2015; Bischof 2017). For Model 3 in Table D.3, I classify all parties considered by either Meguid (2005) or Adams et al. (2006) as ‘mainstream’ to be such, and all others as ‘niche’ – leading me to classify only socialist, social democratic, liberal, conservative, agrarian and Christian democratic parties as mainstream, and all others as niche.¹³ However, I show below that the results reported in Table D.3 are also robust to four alternative approaches to classify parties as either mainstream or niche. These are: (1) the classification scheme proposed by Meguid (2005, 2008), where only green, radical right and ethnoterritorial parties are labeled ‘niche’ and all other parties mainstream; (2) the classification scheme preferred by Adams et al. (2006), where communist, green and extreme nationalist (or radical right) parties are classified as niche parties, and socialist, social democratic, liberal, conservative and Christian democratic parties as mainstream; (3) the continuous measure of a party’s ‘niceness’ suggested by Bischof (2017), which defines a party’s ‘niceness’ as the extent to which it focuses its attention on a particular ideological segment of the political market; (4) the alternative continuous measure of ‘niceness’ proposed by (Meyer and Miller 2015). When implementing the last two approaches, I classify the parties which obtain an above-median ‘niceness’ score as niche, and the remainder as mainstream.

Figure D.1 demonstrates that even if parties’ major party status and ‘niceness’ are negatively associated¹⁴, there is considerable heterogeneity in the ‘niceness’ of major and minor parties, regardless of the approach used. In particular, around half the mainstream parties in the sample are small, rather than large, mainstream parties, and small mainstream parties constitute between a quarter and a third of parties in the sample. These are parties like the Free Democratic Party in Germany or the Christian Democrats in Sweden – parties which are commonplace in governing coalitions across Europe, and

¹³As in Meguid (2005, 2008) and Adams et al. (2006), party family designations are taken from the Comparative Manifesto Project.

¹⁴An LPM analysis of the association between major party status and party niceness, with country fixed effects, finds a strong and statistically significant negative association between the two, by either measure.

Figure D.1: Distributions of ‘Nicheness’ by Party Size



Note: These figures plot the distribution of ‘nicheness’ for major and minor parties, demonstrating that there is heterogeneity in the ‘nicheness’ of minor parties, and also of major parties, to some degree. In Figure C.1.1, following Meguid (2005), parties are classified as mainstream or niche on the basis of party family, with green, radical right and ethnoterritorial parties classified as ‘niche’ and all others mainstream. In Figure C.1.2, following Adams et al. (2006), communist, green and radical right parties as niche and all others mainstream. Figure C.1.3 classifies all parties considered by Meguid (2005) or Adams et al. (2006) to be ‘mainstream’ as such and all others as ‘niche’. Figure C.1.4 classifies parties with above-median nicheness scores in Bischof (2017) as niche and the remainder as mainstream. Figure C.1.5 repeats this procedure using nicheness scores from Meyer and Miller (2015). Per the discussion in Section 3.1, I classify those parties which obtained at least 13% of seats, on average, between 2000 and 2014 as ‘major’, and the remainder as ‘minor’.

often assume the role of kingmaker in coalition negotiations. Meanwhile, there also exist several examples of large niche parties – such as the Freedom Party of Austria or the New Flemish Alliance in Flanders — although fewer in number.

Table D.4: Mainstream and Niche Party Behavior by Party Size

	(1) Meguid (2005)	(2) Adams (2006)	(3) Bischof (2017)	(4) Meyer & Miller (2015)
Supporter Extremism	0.223 (0.115)	0.115 (0.096)	0.268 (0.189)	0.326 (0.199)
Supporter Extremism × Major Niche	0.073 (0.129)	-0.314 (0.612)	-0.394 (0.418)	-0.606 (0.339)
Supporter Extremism × Minor Niche	0.242 (0.205)	0.348* (0.136)	0.216 (0.232)	0.126 (0.277)
Supporter Extremism × Major Mainstream	-0.505*** (0.153)	-0.367* (0.161)	-0.622** (0.213)	-0.613** (0.208)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.203* (0.080)	-0.181* (0.080)	-0.137 (0.101)	-0.102 (0.106)
Prior Office Experience	0.120 (0.208)	0.098 (0.207)	0.295 (0.225)	0.242 (0.221)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	-0.076 (0.077)	0.032 (0.082)	0.007 (0.080)	0.037 (0.082)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,154	1,154	1,058	1,058
Log Likelihood	-1,379.705	-1,408.085	-1,282.421	-1,312.295

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of party issue emphases. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major mainstream, major niche, minor mainstream and minor niche parties, as well as country-issue fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

Table D.4 replicates Model 3 from Table D.3 using the four alternative classification strategies discussed above. As in the original analysis, the estimates strongly support the view that minor mainstream parties behave more like minor niche parties than larger mainstream parties when choosing issues to emphasized – evidenced by the consistently positive coefficient on supporter extremism, alongside the robustly negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between supporter extremism and major mainstream party status.

Next, Model 4 in Table D.3 explores the possibility that systematic differences in the organizational structure of major and minor parties may be driving their differences in emphasis strategy. Empirically, major parties are more often leadership-dominated, whereas

minor parties are more likely to be activist-dominated.¹⁵ Leader-dominated parties might have emphasis strategies more focused on the median voter, and therefore be more electorally successful, and activist-dominated parties might have emphasis strategies that are more focused on voters similar to party activists, and so are less electorally successful. To evaluate this possibility, I interact a measure of the degree to which the formal party structure is dominated by the party leadership with the extremism, or distinctiveness, of the party’s core supporters – using the measure developed by Schumacher and Giger (2017) to measure the extent of leadership domination within a party. This measure considers the degree to which a party is activist-dominated or leadership-dominated.¹⁶ However, as this variable is only available for a subset of the parties in my full sample, the number of observations I rely on for my inferences shrinks considerably in the following analyses.¹⁷ To allow activist-dominated parties to emphasize different issues from leader-dominated parties, I allow leadership domination to have an issue-specific effect on party emphasis. We continue to find a substantively and statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy – suggesting the dominant role of party leaders vs. activists within some parties cannot explain the difference we observe between major and minor parties’ emphasis strategies.

Model 5 in Table D.3 examine the possibility that the difference in behavior between major and minor parties we observe is actually being driven by systematic differences in the ‘challenger party status’ of these two types of parties – major parties typically being ‘mainstream’ and ‘challenger’ parties typically minor. A party type first identified by Hobolt and de Vries (2012), challenger parties are parties with no post-war experience of office – in contrast with ‘mainstream’ parties, which have some (relatively recent) experience of government. However, while there is substantial overlap in the parties which are major and parties which are ‘mainstream’ by this account, many of the parties I label ‘minor’ do, in fact, have substantial cabinet experience as junior coalition partners. Indeed, while 95.1% of major parties have post-war office experience, so do 43.9% of

¹⁵I find this to be the case by a small margin in my dataset, using information on membership influence within parties available in the Integrated Party Organization Dataset (Schumacher and Giger 2017).

¹⁶In my sample, this measure ranges between -0.25 and 1 with a standard deviation of 0.248 , with larger values indicating that a party is more leadership-dominated. The measure is constructed using responses to expert surveys collected by Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2012). They define leadership domination as in Schumacher, de Vries and Vis (2013), with leadership-dominated parties being characterized by “a limited number of internal veto players and a concentration of power among a select group of party leaders”, whereas activist-dominated parties those in which “decision-making and veto power is dispersed among large groups of party activists, organized in local, regional and national party branches or civil society organizations” (Schumacher, de Vries and Vis 2013, 464).

¹⁷This data is only available for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

minor parties – implying that the major-minor party distinction may still be meaningful even after challenger party status is accounted for. Model 5 evaluates this possibility by including an additional interaction term between supporter extremism and whether a party has held office in the post-war period. As in previous analyses, I allow challenger parties to emphasize different issues from mainstream parties by allowing prior office experience to have an issue-specific effect on party emphasis. We continue to find a large and statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy, suggesting that the observed difference is not a consequence of major parties’ disproportionate presence among the ranks of governing parties.

Finally, Model 6 explores the possibility that the observed difference is a consequence of systematic underlying differences in the office aspirations of these two types of parties. That is, perhaps minor parties tend to emphasize their more extreme or distinctive policy positions because they are policy-seeking rather than office-seeking, and thus remain small, whereas major parties are those whose leaders aspire to, and therefore can achieve, higher political office. I evaluate this possibility by interacting a measure of each party’s office aspirations with the extremism, or distinctiveness, of the party’s core supporters. Following Schumacher et al. (2015), I measure a party’s latent office aspirations using its historical success or failure in achieving office.¹⁸ We continue to find a statistically significant difference in emphasis strategy between major and minor parties. This suggests that, even after controlling for the revealed office aspirations of a party, minor parties are systematically more likely than major parties to emphasize issues where their policies are further from the median voter than those of their competitors.¹⁹

Appendix E Robustness Checks

E.1 Replication of Baseline Results with Manifesto Data

Table E.1 replicates Table 2 from the paper using data from the 2017a release of the Comparative Manifesto Project to measure parties’ issue emphases in place of expert

¹⁸This is operationalized using the proportion of years a party has been in office since its foundation. Information on each party’s governing history is taken from the Integrated Party Organization Dataset (IPOD) constructed by Giger and Schumacher (2015).

¹⁹Relatedly, it might be argued that whether a party is vote-seeking or policy-seeking depends on how long it has been out of government. To investigate this possibility, I reestimate Model 6 using time out of government rather than the Schumacher et. al. measure of fraction of years in government. The two measures are, unsurprisingly, correlated. I find that the substantive results of Model 6 are unchanged in this case (results available upon request).

Table E.1: Table 2 Results Replicated with Manifesto Data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supporter Extremism	0.425 (0.294)	1.419* (0.564)		
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.590 (0.436)	-1.860* (0.832)		
Supporter Distinctiveness			0.287 (0.215)	0.645* (0.328)
Supporter Distinctiveness \times Major			-0.570 (0.309)	-1.004* (0.393)
Supporter Disagreement		0.063 (0.256)		-0.130 (0.284)
Prior Office Experience		-0.001 (0.627)		0.073 (0.621)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis		0.090 (0.069)		0.092 (0.069)
#Party-Issue Observations	803	719	803	719
R ²	0.683	0.697	0.682	0.690
Adjusted R ²	0.604	0.607	0.603	0.599

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report OLS coefficient estimates from a fixed effects linear model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

assessments from CHES (Volkens et al. 2017). Although available for the widest range of country-election observations, and asking experts to consider virtually the same issues as in the 2014 EES, CHES data only provides an indirect measure of party emphasis decisions. Alternatively, data from party manifestos provides us with a direct and continuous measure of party emphasis on various issues.²⁰ However, data from CHES is preferred for the baseline analyses, as the CMP does not contain information for as many minor parties, and has not yet incorporated manifestos from elections most proximate to 2014 for many countries I am able to include in the analysis when using CHES data.²¹ As a consequence, the size of the sample falls by more than a third when we move from using CHES to CMP data to measure party issue emphases. Nevertheless, so long as we control for other factors important for party emphasis strategies (Models 2 and 4), we continue to find a statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy in response to changes in core supporter preferences.

E.2 Replication of Baseline Results with Continuous Measure of Historical Performance

In the paper, following the discussion in Section 2 and 3.1, I distinguish between major and minor parties on the basis of differences in their historical electoral performance. However, given the analyses I present in Figure 1—revealing a near-discontinuous difference in party strategy between parties that obtained less than 11 or 12% of seats, on average, between 2000 and 2014, and those that exceeded this threshold—I argue for a qualitative difference in the strategies preferred by parties I class as major, and those I class as minor. Nevertheless, Table E.2 replicates Table 2 while interacting the extremism of party’s core supporters with a continuous measure of historical electoral performance instead. The coefficient on this interaction term is negative and statistically significant across specifications, consistent with the argument that parties which were historically more successful are more likely to de-emphasize issues where their core supporters are more extreme. However, a comparison of Akaike Information Criterion (or Bayesian Information Criterion) scores reveals that Model 2 from Table 2 provides a better fit for the

²⁰CMP coded quasi-sentences were assigned to issues as follows: civil liberties (per201, per605), state intervention in the economy (per401–407, per409, p411–415), redistribution (per503), same sex marriage (per603–604), environmental protection (per416, per501), restrictions on immigration (per601.2, per602.2), taxes versus public spending (per505–507), EU integration (per108, per110).

²¹CMP data for the relevant election is only available for the following countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

data than Model 2 from Table E.2, suggesting that the effect of historical electoral performance on its emphasis strategy tapers off after a party’s historical electoral performance surmounts some threshold near 12% of seats.

Table E.2: Table 2 Results Replicated with Continuous Measure of Historical Performance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supporter Extremism	0.203*** (0.058)	0.339*** (0.100)		
Supporter Extremism \times Average Historical Seat Share	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.014** (0.005)		
Supporter Distinctiveness			0.211** (0.067)	0.277*** (0.083)
Supporter Distinctiveness \times Average Historical Seat Share			-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.012*** (0.003)
Supporter Disagreement		-0.182* (0.078)		-0.210** (0.078)
Prior Office Experience		0.182 (0.215)		0.214 (0.207)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis		0.053 (0.085)		0.072 (0.086)
Observations	1,298	1,154	1,298	1,154
Log Likelihood	-1,685.799	-1,482.017	-1,683.554	-1,481.588

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report coefficient estimates from an unconditional fixed effects ordered logit model of parties’ issue emphasis decisions. A party’s average historical seat share is its average seat share in national legislative elections between 2000 and 2014. All models include country-issue fixed effects and allow historical seat share to have an issue-specific effect on party emphasis. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

E.3 Replication of Baseline Results by FE Ordered Logit

Table E.3 replicates Table 2 from the paper using an unconditional fixed effects ordered logit estimator in place of the BUC estimator. The BUC estimator is preferred to the unconditional fixed effects logit estimator as the latter produces estimates that are inconsistent as well as severely biased when group sizes are small (Beck 2015; Katz 2001; Coupé 2005). Regardless, the results we obtain are substantively and statistically similar: in

all cases, we find a large and statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy in response to changes in core supporter preferences. Moreover, our estimates imply that major parties will tend to place less emphasis on an issue when core supporters have more extreme preferences on the issue, whereas minor parties will increase their emphasis on the issue under similar circumstances.

Table E.3: Table 2 Results Replicated by FE Ordered Logit

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supporter Extremism	0.253** (0.092)	0.435** (0.148)		
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.413* (0.164)	-0.797** (0.257)		
Supporter Distinctiveness			0.259** (0.091)	0.343** (0.122)
Supporter Distinctiveness \times Major			-0.469*** (0.141)	-0.568*** (0.162)
Supporter Disagreement		-0.309** (0.113)		-0.326** (0.115)
Prior Office Experience		0.218 (0.283)		0.219 (0.276)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis		0.145 (0.186)		0.183 (0.191)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,298	1,154	1,298	1,154
Log Likelihood	-778.134	-679.0436	-775.9729	-679.2799

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report coefficient estimates from an unconditional fixed effects ordered logit model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

Relative to the results obtained when using a BUC estimator, the size of the effects implied by the coefficient estimates are consistently larger in magnitude – whether for

major parties or minor parties. However, this is likely a result of bias in our estimates, as previous analyses have shown that when the number of observations in a group is 2, $\hat{\beta} \rightarrow 2\beta$ as $N \rightarrow \infty$ (Andersen 1973, 66). In my analysis, the average number of observations within each country-issue group is 6.81.

E.4 Replication of Baseline Results by OLS

Next, Table E.4 replicates Table 2 in the paper using OLS in place of the BUC estimator. In cases where the incidental parameters problem may pose a concern, researchers have frequently advocated using OLS instead of a conditional logit or an unconditional fixed effects logit estimator, as this allows us to recover marginal effects uncontaminated by any inconsistently estimated fixed effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Greene 2005, 697). However, there are three concerns with using an OLS estimator in my case. First, when there are very few observations within a group fixed effect, it emerges that an OLS estimator produces estimates that are less accurate than those produced by a conditional logit estimator (Beck 2015, 11–17). Second, an OLS approach assumes a cardinal dependent variable – a heroic assumption in my case, as this requires, for instance, that the gap in emphasis between a party’s third most important issue and its second most important issue is the same as that between its third most important issue and any issue outside the top three. Third, as the BUC estimator estimates values for the threshold parameters in addition to the regressors, it reduces the loss of efficiency that results from using a four point scale rather than an eight point scale to measure the distribution of party emphasis across eight issues.

Still, the results we obtain using OLS are very similar to those obtained using the BUC estimator, albeit with estimates for the effect of supporter extremism on parties’ issue emphasis decisions that are smaller in magnitude. However, this might be explained by any attenuation bias that results from assuming cardinality of the dependent variable in OLS. This seems likely, as there are several issues which both major and minor parties place little emphasis on, when emphasis is measured using a four point scale – for instance, civil liberties and the environment. Consequently, for some issues, there is likely considerable unmeasured variation in the dependent variable, which is accounted for to some extent by allowing the threshold parameters to vary (as in the BUC estimator).

Table E.4: Table 2 Results Replicated by OLS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supporter Extremism	0.088** (0.028)	0.169** (0.051)		
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.120* (0.052)	-0.252*** (0.075)		
Supporter Distinctiveness			0.069** (0.026)	0.118** (0.040)
Supporter Distinctiveness \times Major			-0.124** (0.042)	-0.187*** (0.054)
Supporter Disagreement		-0.059 (0.032)		-0.078* (0.031)
Prior Office Experience		0.039 (0.082)		0.044 (0.082)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis		0.085 (0.094)		0.093 (0.093)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,298	1,154	1,298	1,154
R ²	0.386	0.413	0.385	0.411
Adjusted R ²	0.263	0.275	0.262	0.272

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report coefficient estimates from a fixed effects linear model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

Table E.5: Robustness to Excluding Particular Issues

Excluded Category	Supporter Extremism	Supporter Extremism \times Major
Civil Liberties	0.415*** (0.106)	-0.740*** (0.158)
Environment	0.251* (0.101)	-0.544*** (0.152)
EU Integration	0.397*** (0.113)	-0.733*** (0.165)
Immigration	0.379*** (0.103)	-0.732*** (0.146)
Public Spending vs. Taxation	0.411*** (0.119)	-0.897*** (0.213)
Redistribution	0.416*** (0.103)	-0.336* (0.166)
Same Sex Marriage	0.343** (0.107)	-0.631*** (0.157)
State Intervention	0.377*** (0.101)	-0.718*** (0.161)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

E.5 Robustness to Influential Observations

In cross-sectional analyses, a possible concern is that the results may be very sensitive to the exclusion of particular cases. To eliminate this possibility, I replicate Model 2 from Table 2 in the paper while excluding issues and countries one at a time. The results of this exercise are presented in Tables E.5 and E.6. We see that the relevant coefficient estimates and standard errors are exceedingly stable across specifications.

Table E.6: Robustness to Excluding Particular Countries

Excluded Category	Supporter Extremism	Supporter Extremism \times Major
Austria	0.337*** (0.101)	-0.537*** (0.154)
Bulgaria	0.341*** (0.099)	-0.591*** (0.154)
Croatia	0.361*** (0.102)	-0.636*** (0.159)
Czech Republic	0.403*** (0.097)	-0.650*** (0.165)
Denmark	0.345*** (0.103)	-0.607*** (0.160)
Estonia	0.339*** (0.100)	-0.550*** (0.152)
Finland	0.297*** (0.100)	-0.599*** (0.159)
Flanders	0.347*** (0.102)	-0.659*** (0.151)
France	0.336*** (0.100)	-0.621*** (0.161)
Germany	0.328*** (0.101)	-0.591*** (0.155)
Greece	0.352*** (0.110)	-0.650*** (0.168)
Hungary	0.331*** (0.100)	-0.575*** (0.155)

Table E.6: Robustness to Excluding Particular Countries

Excluded Category	Supporter Extremism	Supporter Extremism × Major
Ireland	0.338*** (0.101)	-0.616*** (0.159)
Italy	0.359*** (0.104)	-0.628*** (0.163)
Latvia	0.353*** (0.100)	-0.613*** (0.156)
Lithuania	0.361*** (0.102)	-0.619*** (0.158)
Poland	0.346*** (0.100)	-0.626*** (0.159)
Portugal	0.338*** (0.100)	-0.624*** (0.162)
Romania	0.361*** (0.105)	-0.618*** (0.159)
Slovakia	0.365*** (0.103)	-0.628*** (0.158)
Slovenia	0.353*** (0.100)	-0.594*** (0.158)
Spain	0.355*** (0.100)	-0.576*** (0.156)
Sweden	0.275** (0.104)	-0.565*** (0.168)
The Netherlands	0.339*** (0.102)	-0.562*** (0.159)
United Kingdom	0.404*** (0.098)	-0.648*** (0.157)
Wallonia	0.346*** (0.099)	-0.611*** (0.156)

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

E.6 Alternative Measures of Core Supporters

Table E.7: Table 2 Results with Alternative Measures of Core Supporters

	(1) >10 Supporters	(2) >15 Supporters	(3) Approach A	(4) Approach B	(5) Approach C	(6) Approach D
Supporter Extremism	0.592** (0.204)	0.266 (0.283)	0.289* (0.089)	0.195** (0.064)	0.447** (0.173)	0.373*** (0.094)
Supporter Extremism × Major	-0.814** (0.267)	-0.734* (0.353)	-0.425** (0.150)	-0.206* (0.096)	-0.750* (0.264)	-0.521* (0.218)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.331 (0.228)	-0.469 (0.335)	-0.055 (0.072)	-0.353** (0.118)	-0.100 (0.134)	-0.115 (0.101)
Prior Office Experience	0.213 (0.299)	0.097 (0.300)	0.144 (0.217)	0.072 (0.197)	-0.333 (0.432)	0.081 (0.182)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	0.004 (0.104)	0.051 (0.106)	0.033 (0.082)	0.072 (0.085)	-0.214 (0.184)	0.044 (0.084)
#Party-Issue Observations	576	424	1042	1252	420	1,373
Log Likelihood	-655.716	-471.142	-1,299.158	-1,622.397	-483.347	-1,794.978


*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

For the main analyses, two types of respondents are coded as 'core supporters' of a party: (i) strong or weak partisans with high political interest, and (ii) strong partisans with moderate political interest. This approach leads to 6.8% of EES respondents being classified as core supporters of a party, with an average of 28.8 core supporters for each major party and 8.1 core supporters for each minor party. Table E.7 explores the implications of requiring that a party have at least 10 or 15 core supporters to be included in the sample (Models 1–2), as well as using four other approaches to identify core supporters (Models 3–6): (A) strong partisans with at least moderate political interest, (B) all partisans with at least moderate political interest, (C) all strong partisans and (D) all partisans. Again, across specifications, we continue to find a substantively and statistically significant difference between major and minor party emphasis strategy in response to changes in core supporter preferences.

E.7 Alternative Thresholds for Major Party Classification

Figure E.1: Trend in Model Fit as Threshold for Historical Electoral Performance Varies



In the paper, I identify major and minor parties on the basis of their average seat share in national legislative elections between 2000 and 2014, with parties that received at least 13% of seats, on average, in this period being classed as ‘major’ and the remainder ‘minor’. Figure E.1 demonstrates that the statistical model best explains parties’ emphasis strategies when this is the selected combination of time frame and seat share threshold, and that a different time frame reduces model fit (when measured using the Akaike Information Criterion).²² To generate this figure, I re-estimate Model 2 from Table 2 in the paper, using a different combination of year threshold and average seat share threshold to classify parties as major and minor each time. The red line in Figure E.1 plots the trend in AIC score when the year threshold moves from 1960 to 2014, holding the average seat share threshold constant at 13%. The remaining trend lines in Figure E.1 (plotted in orange) depict the trend in the AIC score when the average seat share threshold is instead held constant at other values between 1% and 20%. We arrive at

²²A lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) score indicates better in-sample model fit.

the same conclusion when the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) is used to measure model fit instead.

E.8 Moving Between Major and Minor Party Status

In Section 2, I observe that an implication of the theory is that major and minor parties might change which voters they target in response to changes in their electoral performance. In particular, it seems likely that when a formerly major party loses enough support to become a minor party, its emphasis strategy will evolve accordingly. Likewise, a minor party with growing electoral support may increasingly prefer to emphasize its less distinctive, and more popular, issue positions in order to win support among a broader electorate. In order to fully explore this possibility, a panel analysis of change in party emphasis strategy is necessary. However, as data on both the preferences of party supporters on a range of issues *and* on the emphasis placed by parties on these issues is only available for multiple countries for one year (2014), such an analysis is infeasible at this stage. However, in this section, I use the available data to evaluate whether parties that have only recently surmounted the 13% seat share threshold behave similarly to parties that have long cleared that threshold. Table E.8 reports results from a series of analyses that speak to this question.

Building on the analyses in Section E.7, I replicate Model 2 in Table 2 while gradually lengthening the time frame used to determine a party's historical electoral performance, and therefore, its major party status. I find that there is no statistically significant difference in the emphasis strategy of parties that obtained more than 13% of seats in the most recent election to 2014 and those that did not (Model 1); however, we begin to observe a statistically significant difference in emphasis strategy between parties that surpassed this threshold, on average, in the last four years, and those that did not (Model 2). However, the coefficient on the relevant interaction term increases in magnitude, and the fit of the statistical model (as reflected by the models' AIC/BIC scores) continues to improve, when parties' electoral performance over a longer time frame is taken into account – stabilizing in magnitude as well as fit after about fourteen years. These analyses also speak to the question of how long it takes for a minor party that is electorally successful to begin behaving like a major party – that is, moving from disproportionately emphasizing its distinctive policies to de-emphasizing those issues. The estimates reported in Table E.8 suggest that it takes about fourteen years of surpassing (or falling short of) this threshold, on average, before changes in a party's electoral trajectory are fully reflected

in its emphasis strategy.

Table E.8: How Long Does It Take To Become A Major Party?

	Party Considered 'Major' if Obtained $\geq 13\%$ of Seats Between:								
	(1) 2014-2014	(2) 2010-2014	(3) 2005-2014	(4) 2000-2014	(5) 1995-2014	(6) 1990-2014	(7) 1980-2014	(8) 1970-2014	(9) 1960-2014
Supporter Extremism	0.272** (0.098)	0.336*** (0.097)	0.336*** (0.099)	0.367*** (0.094)	0.372*** (0.096)	0.353*** (0.092)	0.351*** (0.092)	0.355*** (0.092)	0.329*** (0.094)
Supporter Extremism \times Major	-0.155 (0.183)	-0.560*** (0.153)	-0.472** (0.151)	-0.690*** (0.158)	-0.648*** (0.205)	-0.619*** (0.156)	-0.663*** (0.154)	-0.677*** (0.159)	-0.544*** (0.152)
Supporter Disagreement	-0.148* (0.072)	-0.170* (0.074)	-0.172* (0.074)	-0.171* (0.075)	-0.175* (0.075)	-0.159* (0.075)	-0.177* (0.076)	-0.174* (0.077)	-0.188* (0.078)
Prior Office Experience	0.272 (0.192)	0.209 (0.201)	0.219 (0.200)	0.205 (0.205)	0.200 (0.205)	0.250 (0.202)	0.236 (0.202)	0.220 (0.202)	0.192 (0.204)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis	0.122 (0.089)	0.086 (0.089)	0.087 (0.083)	0.074 (0.083)	0.074 (0.083)	0.079 (0.085)	0.089 (0.085)	0.086 (0.085)	0.073 (0.085)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154	1,154
Log Likelihood	-1,520.004	-1,491.336	-1,491.915	-1,482.584	-1,486.280	-1,489.325	-1,488.526	-1,490.295	-1,486.744
Akaike Information Criterion	3066.007	3008.672	3009.830	2991.168	2998.561	3004.651	3003.053	3006.591	2999.488
Bayesian Information Criterion	3122.927	3065.591	3066.750	3048.087	3055.480	3061.570	3059.972	3063.510	3056.408

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties as well as country-issue fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

That the evolution of a party from major to minor status is likely a gradual but converging process is also corroborated by the analyses reported in Table E.9. Models 1 and 2 in Table E.9 replicate Models 1 and 2 from Table 2 in the main paper while adding a second interaction term, this time between the policy extremism of a party's core supporters and its electoral performance between *immediately prior* to the relevant timeframe. In particular, a party is coded as "Past Major" if its average seat share between 1990 and 2000 exceeded 13%. If it were the case that current major party emphasis strategy was also substantially influenced by its electoral performance more than fourteen years prior, we should observe a negative and statistically significant coefficient on this interaction term as well. We do not observe this in either case.

Models 3 and 4 further embellish the case that the process of evolution between major and minor party status is gradual, finding no evidence that 'rising' and 'declining' major parties differ in their responses to the extremism of their core supporters. To evaluate this, I code parties which gained seats in the most recent election as "rising parties" and those that lost seats in the most recent election as "declining parties", and allow for a possible interaction affect between whether or not a party is "rising", its major party status and the extremism of its core supporters. If rising major parties are more likely to de-emphasize issues where their core supporters are extreme than declining major parties, we should observe a negative and statistically significant coefficient on this

interaction term. I find no statistically significant difference in emphasis strategy even between declining and rising major parties, suggesting that while major parties may move towards their core voters, in left-right terms, following a loss of votes or seats (Adams et al. 2004; Adams 2012), they may continue to emphasize the issues where their positions are relatively centrist until they lose enough support to become minor parties.

Table E.9: Declining, Rising, Past vs. Current Major Party Emphasis Strategy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Supporter Extremism	0.205*** (0.058)	0.350*** (0.100)	0.159** (0.060)	0.297* (0.120)
Supporter Extremism × Major	-0.354** (0.119)	-0.473 (0.270)	-0.402** (0.135)	-0.573*** (0.165)
Supporter Extremism × Past Major	0.024 (0.103)	-0.178 (0.258)		
Past Major	0.150 (0.263)	0.387 (0.316)		
Supporter Extremism × Rising			0.187 (0.098)	0.108 (0.143)
Supporter Extremism × Rising × Major			0.007 (0.165)	-0.156 (0.208)
Rising			-0.363 (0.199)	-0.167 (0.225)
Supporter Disagreement		-0.197** (0.076)		-0.201** (0.077)
Prior Office Experience		0.127 (0.209)		0.172 (0.208)
Mean Coalition Partner Emphasis		0.069 (0.085)		0.084 (0.086)
#Party-Issue Observations	1,298	1,154	1,298	1,154
Log Likelihood	-1,686.308	-1,476.194	-1,683.202	-1,475.801

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Note: Cell entries report BUC coefficient estimates from a fixed effects ordered logit model of parties' issue emphasis decisions. All models include issue-specific intercepts for major and minor parties. Standard errors are robust and clustered by country-issue.

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