
PSC 160
Campaigns and Elections: A Global Perspective

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Lecture 4: Institutional Origins of Party Systems II
May 19, 2016

Class Outline

1. In-class reading: Mainwaring and Shugart
2. Parliamentarism, Presidentialism and the Party System
3. Assignment #1

Presidentialism and the Party System

Parliamentarism vs. Presidentialism

Parliamentary and presidential systems of government differ in how the executive and legislature relate to each other.

- ▶ Legislatures:
 - ▶ Hold power to authorize legislation and pass budgets
 - ▶ Debate, amend and formally enact legislation
 - ▶ To pass legislation, majority support in the legislature needed
- ▶ Executives:
 - ▶ May be collegial (e.g. UK cabinet) or unitary (e.g. US president)
 - ▶ In most systems, formulate and implement legislation (exception: the US committee system)

Parliamentarism

A parliamentary system of government is one where:

- ▶ The executive – the Prime Minister and his or her Cabinet – depends on legislative confidence for survival
- ▶ The executive is not popularly elected, but selected by the legislature

Presidentialism

A presidential system of government is one where:

- ▶ The executive is directly elected by voters
- ▶ The executive does not depend on legislative confidence for survival
- ▶ Researchers disagree as to whether, in a presidential system:
 - ▶ The legislature can be dismissed by the executive (Lijphart: yes, Shugart and Carey: no)
- ▶ As a consequence, divided government possible under presidentialism

Presidentialism and the Party System I

The following institutional features influence the level of party system fragmentation in a presidential system:

- ▶ Electoral cycle – are legislative and presidential elections concurrent?
- ▶ Electoral rule used in legislative elections: plurality, PR or majority runoff

Presidentialism and the Party System II

Mainwaring and Shugart argue that the institutional arrangements under presidentialism affect party system fragmentation as follows:

- ▶ Concurrent, president by plurality, legislature by PR: 2–3 parties
 - ▶ Average ENEP: 2.53
 - ▶ Example: Costa Rica, with average ENEP of 2.42
 - ▶ True even if effective district magnitude is very high – e.g. Uruguay has an effective district magnitude of 99 in its lower house and an average ENEP of 2.55
 - ▶ By contrast, average ENEP in Spain is 3.66 – a parliamentary system with a DM of 6.73 (Balfour 2005)

Presidentialism and the Party System III

Cont'd:

- ▶ Non-concurrent elections, legislature by PR: 3 or more parties
 - ▶ Average ENEP: 4.88
- ▶ President elected by majority runoff, legislature by PR: 3 or more parties
 - ▶ Average ENEP: 5.14
- ▶ All else equal, use of list PR in the legislature increases the number of parties

Presidentialism and the Party System IV

Table 11.2. Institutional configurations and effective number of congressional parties in Latin American countries

Country (chamber)	Number of elections	Average effective magnitude	Average effective number of parties (standard deviation)
<i>President elected by plurality, congress concurrent</i>			
Dominican Republic (upper)	8	1 ^a	1.70 (.30)
Brazil, 1945-50 (upper)	3	1 or 2 ^a	2.71 (.47)
Dominican Republic (lower)	8	3.4	2.17 (.49)
Honduras	4	6.3	2.07 (.09)
Venezuela (upper)	8	6.5	2.76 (.80)
Peru, 1980 (lower)	1	7.0	2.47 (—)
Costa Rica	11	7.7	2.42 (.41)
Brazil, 1945-50 (lower)	2	6.5 ^c	3.44 (.94)
Venezuela (lower)	8	25.8	3.31 (.97)
Uruguay (upper)	11	30	2.55 (.41)
Peru, 1980 (upper)	1	60	3.22 (—)
Uruguay (lower)	11	99	2.65 (.38)
Mean of all individual elections	76	—	2.53 (.68)
<i>President elected by majority runoff, concurrent elections</i>			
Brazil, 1994 (upper)	1	1 or 2 ^a	6.08
Chile, 1989-93 (upper) ^d	2	2	4.51
Chile, 1989-93 (lower)	2	2	4.91 (.29)
Ecuador, 1979-94	7	3.0	5.95 (1.28)
El Salvador, 1994-present	1	5.3	3.06 (—)
Peru, 1985-90, 1995 (lower)	3	7.0	3.79 (1.82)
Brazil, 1994 (lower)	1	9.5 ^c	8.13 (—)
Peru, 1985-90 (upper)	2	61.5	4.27 (1.80)
Mean of all individual elections	19	—	5.14 (1.61)
<i>Congress and presidential elections nonconcurrent</i>			
Brazil, 1986-90 (upper)	2	1 or 2 ^a	3.91 (2.31)
Brazil, 1954-62 (upper)	3	1 or 2 ^a	3.94 (.53)
El Salvador, 1985-91	3	4.4	2.51 (.32)
Chile, 1932-73 (upper)	9 ^e	5	5.17 (.90)
Chile, 1932-73 (lower)	11	5.2	5.65 (1.63)
Brazil, 1954-62 (lower)	3	6.8 ^c	4.55 (.05)
Brazil, 1986-90 (lower)	2	9.3 ^c	5.74 (4.12)
Mean of all individual elections	33	—	4.88 (1.64)

Presidentialism and the Party System V

Country	N_p	N_v
Regimes using (effective) plurality for president		
<u>Assembly PR, concurrent</u>		
Argentina	2.6	3.0
midterm	--	3.2
Brazil (1945-50)	2.5	3.4*
Costa Rica	2.2	2.6
Dominican Republic	2.7	2.9
Nicaragua	2.2	2.2
Venezuela	2.6	3.4
Mean of all (excluding midterm elections)	2.5	3.1
<u>Assembly PR, all nonconcurrent</u>		
Brazil (1955-62)	2.7	4.5*
Chile (1933-73)	2.7	6.9
Colombia	2.7	2.1
Mean of all	2.7	5.0
<u>Assembly plurality, concurrent</u>		
Philippines	2.0	2.1
United States	2.1	2.1
Regimes using majority for president		
<u>Assembly concurrent with first round</u>		
Chile (1989)	2.6	2.6
Ecuador	5.0	7.4
midterm	--	10.8
Peru	3.4	3.4
Mean of all (excluding midterm elections)	4.1	5.8
<u>Assembly nonconcurrent</u>		
Brazil (1989-90)	5.3	8.7*
France	4.0	4.8
Portugal	2.3	4.0
Mean of all,	3.5	4.3

no concrete proof for correlation for subjectivity of hypothesis

*Seat-winning parties; figures for votes (which would be higher) were unobtainable.

Presidentialism and Party Discipline I

- ▶ Party discipline typically much higher in parliamentary than presidential systems
 - ▶ Why? Dependence of executive on legislative confidence
 - ▶ Influenced by whether legislative elections are candidate- or party-centered (19th century Britain – Cox 1987)

Presidentialism and Party Discipline II

In presidential system, influenced by whether legislature is elected by list PR

- ▶ If closed list PR, party leaders control order in which members are elected
 - ▶ Increases incentive to toe the party line
 - ▶ Reduces incentive for legislators to cultivate a personal vote
 - ▶ Examples: Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela
- ▶ If open list PR, votes pooled among candidates
 - ▶ Does not eliminate incentive to cultivate a personal vote
 - ▶ Examples: Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay

Presidentialism and Party Discipline III

Also influenced by whether presidential nominees are chosen by open primaries

- ▶ If open primaries, party 'insiders' have less influence on the choice of nominee
 - ▶ Candidates who are extreme relative to the median party legislator may be selected as nominee
 - ▶ Examples: United States, Venezuela, Argentina

Assignment I: Annotated Bibliography

Next Class: Class Voting in Industrial Democracies

To read before class on Monday: Dalton, 'Political Cleavages, Issues, and Electoral Change'.